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Regional Convergence
and Regional Policy in the
European Union
Carol M. Glen
Valdosta State University
It has long been recognized that regional disparities
in
wealth across the European Union could have negative
implications for the process of integration , in both political and economic terms . This paper examines national
and regional disparities
in wealth across the EU , and
across time, to determine whether or not such disparities
are being diminished . It also examines the role played by
EU regional policy in this regard. The paper concludes
that while some success has been achieved at the national level , this success hides a much more heterogeneous mix of convergence
and dispersion at the regional
level . Despite the increased funds that have been devoted
to EU regional policy in recent years , it is argued that
the impact of regional policy may be more political than
economic; regional policy promotes the ideal of cohesion
more than the reality of economic convergence .

INTRODUCTION

I

t has long been recognized by the European Union (EU) and
by scholars of integration generally, that persistent disparities
in wealth across the members of the Union could have negative implications for the process of integration. The Treaty of
Rome explicitly articulated the view that successful integration
could only be achieved by 'mitigating the backwardness of less
favored regions.' This opinion was strongly reaffirmed within the
Single European Act, the Treaty on European Union, and the
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Treaty of Amsterdam , all of which underlined the EU 's commitment to social and economic cohesion. Despite good intentions
however, regional disparities persist and could place economic
and political barriers in the way of deeper integration.
The existence of significant differences in prosperity across
the Union has been blamed for undermining a number of EU
economic goals. One of the principle objectives of the integration process is to increase European competitiveness, and
thereby overall prosperity , by reducing the barriers to the movement of both goods and factors within the EU. Such liberalization should lead to gains in the overall level of Union welfare,
yet persistent regional disparities in wealth can interfere with
allocative efficiency and prevent an economy from achieving its
optimum productive capacity . Within the EU, failure to address
such problems as over-concentration and under-utilization of
resources could therefore reduce productivity growth and absolute gains.
The political implications of persistent wealth disparities for
the process of integration are equally significant. As early as
1973, the EC Commission recognized that questions related to
distribution and redistribution could sabotage integration attempts then underway . The Thompson Report (CEC 1973) stated
that:
no community could maintain itself nor have any
meaning for the peoples which belong to it so long as
they have different standards of living and have cause
to doubt the common will of all to help each member
to better the conditions of its people.

Underpinning this statement is the assumption that a link exists between the equitable distribution of the benefits from integration, and support for the process itself. Such a perspective is
neither new nor unusual , for national governments have long
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been aware that an uneven distribution of benefits within states
can bring political costs regardless of whether the nation as a
whole is increasing in prosperity. However, at the international
level, where national pride combines with sovereignty, concerns
regarding relative gains and losses may be all the greater. From
this perspective, regardless of how successful the European Union is in achieving greater overall prosperity, the absolute, or
even the relative losers in this process could threaten the cohesion of the system.
The purpose of this paper is to examine national and regional
disparities in wealth across the European Union and across time.
In order to do so, trends in the per capita income of member
states is analyzed over a thirty year period, while trends in the
per capita income of EU regions is examined over two decades.'
Several questions are of interest: to what degree has economic
convergence occurred among EU member states? Has the EU
been successful in closing the wealth gap between its rich and
poor regions? What has been the impact of EU regional policy
with respect to economic convergence and cohesion?
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Economic Perspectives
The branch of economic analysis that focuses on the economics of international integration is of relatively recent origin. In an
extensive study of the theory of economic integration, Machlup
(1977) was unable to find a single instance of its use prior to
1942. However, when we examine the theory in terms of its
component parts, its origins are obviously much older. Modern
economic integration theory focuses on the process by which
'National level data is derived from European Economy (1999); regional data is derived
from Eurostat's Regio database.
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separate economies are combined into larger economic regions
through the removal of barriers to trade and by eliminating trade
discrimination (Robson 1984). As a result, it utilizes orthodox
theories of trade whose lineage is as old as the study of economics itself. Classical economists from Smith to Ricardo to Mill
discussed at length the collective advantages that would accrue
from liberalizing trade, primarily as a consequence of an international division of labor and comparative advantage. In a similar
vein, neoclassical economists who have built on this earlier theory also emphasize the beneficial effects of free trade in terms of
overall welfare.
The economic reasoning for proceeding down the road toward greater integration is allocative efficiency and economic
growth. It is based on the belief that the potential level of welfare
that can be achieved by forming an economic community is
greater than the sum of the welfare levels available to countries
following unilateral policies (El-Agraa 1989, 101). Orthodox
theories of trade, customs unions and common markets are therefore generally unconcerned with distributional effects, focusing
instead on absolute welfare gains for the community as a whole.
Although neoclassical theory has largely dominated the study
of international trade, its theoretical assumptions have not gone
who11yuncha11enged.Faced with the reality of global economic
inequities that appeared to be growing rather than diminishing
(as anticipated by neoclassical theory), a number of writers developed models to attempt to explain this anomaly. Foremost
among these works was a landmark study by Gunder Myrdal
(1957). In contrast to neoclassical expectations, Myrdal contends
that trade, and the movements of labor and capital, cannot by
themselves counteract a natural tendency toward regional inequity. Rather "they are the media through which the cumulative
process evolves-upwards in the lucky regions and downwards
in the unlucky ones" (1957, 27). Myrdal describes this as the
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"circular causation of a cumulative process" ( 1957, 12). Conclusions drawn from this model differ substantially from conclusions derived from neoclassical theory. Principally, cumulative
causation theory postulates that the operation of market forces
tends to increase rather than decrease inequality between rich
and poor regions, as a consequence of their different economic
starting points and resource endowments. The comparative advantage of rich regions lies in capital and research intensive
products. The comparative advantage of poor countries lies in
labor and land-intensive products.
Similar concepts have been applied to circumstances in
Europe (e.g. Seers, Schaffer, and Kiljunenl979; Camey, Hudson,
and Lewis 1980). Seers and associates used a core-periphery
metaphor to distinguish between rich and poor countries in
Europe, when they identified an egg-shaped area near the center
of Europe, which they called the "mega-core. "2 The EU countries
that fall unequivocally within this core are France, Germany,
Denmark, and the Benelux countries. Completely outside the
core lie Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Seers et al. (1979)
discovered that the mega-core is a major supplier of capital and
technology, and is home to nearly all of Europe's transnational
corporations, banks, and media. The periphery on the other hand,
has an economy that retains a large agricultural sector, much of
its local manufacturing is foreign owned, and it is more likely to
experience outward migration. The EU Commission has also
used this core-periphery metaphor, conceptualizing peripherality
as being synonymous with geographic inaccessibility to economic activity (CEC 1988).
2

Core-periphery models of development were advanced earlier by the "dependency
schoo l" (e.g., Do s Santos 1971) to explain uneven development at the.;global level.

VOL.

30 2002

52

GLEN

Political Perspectives
Political scientists have also taken an interest in the effects of
inequality on economic integration . However, unlike economists ,
they have tended to focus on the consequences rather than the
causes of uneven development. With regards to the distribution
of benefits obtained as a result of integration, several scholars
have noted the potentially detrimental effects of inequity for the
integration process. Schrnitter argues that the attainment of
common objectives in the integration process is made more difficult by "tension-producing conditions which are caused by the
integration process itself' (1970, 840). Two of these conditions
that are relevant here are ' equity ' and ' envy.' The former refers
to disagreements over perceived benefits once new productive
and distributive forces are unleashed. The latter refers to a
heightened sensitivity to the comparative performance of other
members in the community, generated by higher transactions and
available information. Similarly, others have argued that the success of integration depends on the perceptions of costs and benefits of those involved, and that these perceptions are influenced
by both ideological factors and political expediency (Haas and
Schmitter 1964). Nye (1971) describes the existence of such
concerns as the 'politics of competition' and likens this aspect of
the integration process to a zero-sum game in which the maintenance of status and rank is of primary importance.
As well as potentially aggravating competition between governments, the persistence of regional wealth disparities could
also threaten popular support for integration. Populations in poor
or declining regions may be less willing to go along with a further deepening of the process if they feel that integration has already brought them harm. This is particularly relevant when one
considers the increasingly vocal demands of sub-national ethnic
groups, and the growing legitimacy of territorially based initiatives within the EU which have together placed regionalism in
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the ascendancy. Europe is ethnically and culturally diverse and
these sub-national cleavages continue to have relevance for the
integration process. As one French official put it the "reality of
life here and throughout Europe (is that) regions are becoming
new hubs of influence and strength" (Krause 1994, 22). Today
most of the EU's regional authorities directly lobby in EU institutions in Brussels.
The EU is now faced with the twin challenges of convergence
and cohesion. Convergence refers to the harmonization of
macro-economic indicators and is closely tied to European
Monetary Union (EMU). Cohesion refers to the raising of living
standards for all, and represents a social solidarity among rich
and poor member states alike. The paradox however, is that these
two goals may be in some ways contradictory. In order to
achieve convergence, governments may be forced to cut back on
measures that bolster cohesion. They may for instance, have to
reduce subsidies or other economic transfers within their own
borders, which is likely to aggravate existing disparities. In addition, as member states increasingly lose their autonomy as a result of EMU, they become less able to deal with regional
imbalances. In such circumstances the role of the EU in promoting cohesion becomes more important. Without some countervailing measures, the goals of convergence and cohesion may
work against one another.
REGIONAL CONVERGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The economic make-up of the EU has often been described in
dichotomous terms: as comprising a core and periphery, or as
being overdeveloped and underdeveloped (Clout 1981). In light
of the economic distinctions that can be made between EU regions, these characterizations seem appropriate. The poorer peripheral regions of Europe can be distinguished across a number
of socio-economic indicators. They are more likely to have a
higher proportion of their workforce engaged in agriculture, to
have a weaker industrial sector, and have more limited infraVOL. 30 2002
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structure than elsewhere in Europe. The peoples of poorer regions are also more likely to have fewer of their children educated beyond high school. Poorer regions spend proportionately
less of their GDP on research and development. Traditionally
most of these regions have been located in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, all of which joined the EU some years after its
inception.
Adding these countries to the EU membership brought obvious consequences for overall levels of wealth disparity in the
Union. Figure 1 traces the level of dispersion in per capita GDP
found among member states during different stages of EU history. EU6 refers to the EU's original six member states. 3 EU9
refers to EU6 plus Ireland, Denmark and the UK, which joined
in 1973. EU 10 represents EU9 plus Greece, which joined in
1981. EU12 includes EUlO plus Spain and Portugal that joined
in 1985. Finally, EU 15 refers to EU 12 plus Austria, Finland and
Sweden that joined in 1995. The most striking detail depicted by
the graph is the enormous impact that newer member states have
had on wealth disparities in the EU. The level of economic disparity in the EU increased with virtually every expansion. Between 1972 (EU6) and 1985 (EU12) disparity levels almost
doubled. The inclusion of Austria, Sweden, and Finland has
helped to ameliorate this divergence only slightly.
The graph does however indicate that some progress has been
made. With each successive expansion overall disparity levels
increased, but they also began to decline fairly quickly. This is
true with all expansions regardless of the period or the countries
involved. The decreasing dispersion rates indicate that the gap
between richer and poorer countries is beginning to close. Interestingly, during the 1990s dispersion levels increased only
among the original six EU members. This anomaly is less surprising however when one considers that this period coincided
with German re-unification.
3

The EU6 countries are Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands .
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Success at the country level can also be illustrated with reference to Table 1, which highlights changes in per capita GDP in
the EU's four poorest member states in relation to the EU average. The case of Ireland is particularly striking, moving from
56% of the EU average in 1973 to 108% of the EU average today. This strong economic performance means that Ireland will
TABLE 1
Per capita GDP as Percentage of EU Average
On Accession
During 1999
to the EU
Ireland (1973)
56%
108%
68%
66%
Greece (1981)
Portugal (1985)
56%
72%
Spain (1985)
74%
76%

likely become a victim of its own success and will no longer be
eligible for payments from the Cohesion Fund when they are
reassessed in 2003. Two of the other three countries have also
converged toward the EU average, although to a lesser degree.
Perhaps most worrying is the case of Greece, which, despite being an EU member longer than either Spain or Portugal has made
no significant progress in converging to the EU average, and indeed, has diverged slightly.4
Success in reducing disparities at the national level should not
obscure differences in wealth at the regional level. The economic
performance of regions and countries are not synonymous; regions are economic entities in their own right. As one commentator noted, "many economic processes involving capital
4

It should be remembered that in comparing national GDP to the EU average we are
discussing only relative wealth. Greece may be improving its economic position in relation to past performance, but it is not doing so as quickly as other member states .
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accumulation or the organization of labor operate at the subnational level. These regional formations ...have their own role in
the national and international economy" (Williams 1987, 243) .
Figure 2 illustrates how trends witnessed at the national level
may not be translated at the regional level. In depicting the economic performance of the EU's five least wealthy regions in comparison to t~e EU's five wealthiest regions, Figure 2 shows that
the gap between rich and poor regions has widened. In 1977 the
EU 's least wealthy regions were four times poorer than its richest;
in 1996 they were over five times poorer. This may not appear to
be a significant increase in disparity. However, to put it another
way, the per capita income of the five richest regions increased
from 206% of the EU average in 1977 to 224 % of that average in
1996. While the per capita income of the EU's five poorest regions
barely moved from 44.5% of the EU average to 44.7% of that average. These results indicate that across the EU, regional disparities are of greater magnitude between regions than between
countries. Moreover, although it might be expected that the poorest regions would be found in the poorest countries, this is clearly
not a linear relationship. All of the wealthiest regions are not, for
instance, found in the wealthiest country. Rather there is considerable overlap between member states, with each incorporating relatively poorer and relatively wealthier regions.
Figure 3 outlines the within-country regional variation in per
capita GDP for all member states. A cursory examination of the
results reveals that the spread of disparity within member states is
greater for some countries than for others. Although the EU's
wealthiest region is found in Germany, that country's poorest regions are less wealthy than a majority of other regions across the
EU, including regions in Spain and Ireland. Indeed, the German
regions show the greatest level of dispersion ranging from a per
capita income of 40,108 ECU in Hamburg to a per capita income
of 12, 661 ECU in Sachsen-Anhalt. A significant spread in disparity is also seen in France, which, although incorporating one of the
VOL. 30 2002
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EU's wealthiest regions, Isle de France, also incorporates regions with incomes that fall below the EU average. The performance of Isle de France highlights how one region can distort the
aggregate national figures, for it accounts for one fifth of per capita GDP in France.
These figures demonstrate that the member state level of
analysis hides a much more heterogeneous sub-national mix and
as a result may reduce our understanding of the nature of wealth
disparities in the EU. By focusing solely on member states there
is a danger that we may not only underestimate the degree of
disparity that exists, but also underestimate its political relevance. It is entirely conceivable that in the aggregate, the member state may be improving its economic position, while regions
within its borders are experiencing serious decline. If these declining regions coincide with ethnic or political cleavages then
such economic difficulties could be used to strengthen separatist
sentiment or ferment political unrest. From an economic perspective, persistent disparities are also undesirable for the EU in
that they represent an inefficient use of economic resources, and
may hinder moves toward deeper integration.
REGIONAL POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The EU has not been blind to the existence of wealth disparities within its borders and has responded by introducing and expanding upon a number of regional policy instruments. Initially,
no provisions were made in Community treaties for a separate
regional policy. Rather, in line with orthodox economic thinking
at the time it was believed that the process of integration itself
would automatically lead to convergence of social and economic
conditions. This view was apparently reinforced by both a period
of unprecedented economic growth following the signing of the
Treaty of Rome, and by the fact that only one country, Italy,
made serious representations in this regard. The EU's first exTHE JOURNAL
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pansion in 1973 however, incorporating Ireland, Denmark, and
the UK, brought greater economic diversity to the Community,
along with the recognition that long term plans for economic
integration would be strengthened if all involved had similar levels of economic development. The Community's first regional
policy was established with the introduction of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975.
Subsequent membership expansions brought increased coverage of regional policy both in terms of geography and budget. At
its inception regional funds accounted for less than 5% of the EU
budget, this figure doubled in the following ten years . Today the
ERDF forms part of the EU's Structural Funds, which also includes the European Social Fund, and funds related to agriculture
and fisheries. Together these funds represent the second biggest
item on the EU budget. In addition to the Structural Funds, the
EU introduced the Cohesion Fund in 1993 in order to promote
economic growth among the EU's poorest countries. The Cohesion Fund differs from the Stri1ctural Funds in that its focus is on
countries and not regions. It applies to countries with a per capita
GDP less than 90% of the EU average; currently Ireland, Spain,
Portugal, and Greece are eligible.
The rationale for the introduction of the Cohesion Fund was
both economic and political. On the economic front it was
closely linked to the nominal convergence of national economies. In order to qualify for EMU member states had to meet a
number of convergence criteria in terms of inflation, interest
rates, public sector indebtedness, and monetary stability. It was
believed that all of this would be more easily achieved with the
establishment of an additional fund targeted at poorer countries.
The Fund was also designed to lessen the impact of any austerity
measures that these governments would have to introduce in order to meet convergence criteria. From a political viewpoint, the
establishment of the Cohesion Fund can also be seen as an incenVOL.
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tive, or side-payment, awarded to recalcitrant countries to encourage them to concede to deeper integration. 5 During negotiations for the Treaty on European Union, the Spanish government
in particular argued forcefully for the inclusion of the Cohesion
Fund.
· Since 1988 the Structural Funds have been focused on six
policy objectives that address both regional and Union-wide
problems. Almost all of the measures (90%) have been taken on
the initiative of member states, and members must co-finance the
programs (COR Opinion 1997). Despite claims of some success,
reform of the Funds became necessary when existing regulations
governing their operation expired in 1999. An even more pressing reason for reform is the prospect of the EU's next expansion.
The future accession of the countries from Central and Eastern
Europe (CCEE) will represent an unprecedented expansion of
the EU and could place tremendous strains on regional funds. Of
the ten CCEE the wealthiest, Slovenia, is poorer than the EU's
current least wealthy member, Greece. Together, the per capita
GDP of the CCEE is three times less than the EU average.
To meet the expected additional burdens of the CCEE, the
Union had the option of increasing required budget contributions
from member states, or reducing the number of regions eligible
for assistance. With little support for increasing contribution, the
latter option was chosen. In its Agenda 2000 strategy document,
the European Commission proposed three themes that would
govern reform of the Structural Funds: concentration of assistance, simplification, and decentralization of management. The
result has been a greater consolidation of the Funds and a greater
targeting toward the most needy regions. The six priority objec5

Moravcsik (1993) goes so far as to argue that since regional policies are "neither significant enough to provide major benefits for donors , nor widely enough distributed to represent a policy of common interest [they] are most plausibly interpreted as side payments
extended in exchange for other policies" (p. 496) .
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tives were collapsed into three and eligibility was tightened. A
comparison of the old and reformed Structural Fund objectives is
displayed in Table 2. It remains to be seen how successful these
reforms will be in alleviating the problem of regional wealth disparities, but the enormity of the problem should not be underestimated.

TABLE2
Structural Fund Objectives
Objectives 1995-1999
Objective ]: structural adjustment of regions lagging
behind in development
Objective 2: re-conversion of
regions in industrial c!ecline

Objective 3 : actions to combat long-term unemployment
Objective 4: actions to prevent unemployment

Objective 5a: modernization
of agricultural structures
Objective 5b: economic diversification in rural areas

Ob_jectives 2000-2006

Objective ]: regions where
the GDP per capita is less
than 75% of the EU average

Objective 2: economic and
social re-conversion of regions that are experiencing
structural difficulties

Objective 3: all actions promoting the development of
human resources, outside regions that are eligible under
Obiective 1

Objective 6: development of
scarcely populated regions
VOL.
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THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL POLICY

The impact of a single policy on an organization as large as
the European Union is difficult to measure, but by tracing trends
in economic convergence and economic divergence over a number of years it has been possible to assess whether the EU's goals
in this area are currently being met. The descriptive analysis in
this study reveals that while significant progress has been made
by some countries in closing the economic gap between themselves and the EU average, this is much less evident at the regional level. Data indicates that poor regions are becoming
comparatively poorer, while rich regions are becoming comparatively richer. This has occurred despite substantial increases in
the availability of EU regional funds in recent years .
Explanations for this apparent lack of success are varied and
can be attributed to factors both within and beyond the EU's control.

Timing of Regional Policy Funds
Substantial increases in regional funds were made available
only during the late 1980s and it is likely that it would take a
number of years before they could impact convergence . In addition, the late 1980s brought a re-orientation of regional policy
that replaced the goal of income redistribution with that of structural adjustment. Rather than attempting to entice external industries to relocate in poor regions, the EU has increasingly sought
strategies that would promote indigenous economic growth.
While this strategy is designed to improve regional competitiveness and provide a solid basis for future growth, it is necessarily
long term in nature.
Size of the funds
Although funds for regional development have increased substantially over the years they still amount to less than a half perTHE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
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cent of EU GDP, so it is questionable just how much impact they
can be expected to have. It could be argued that successes witnessed at the national level are attributable to factors other than
regional policy. The most successful recipient country of Cohesion Funds is Ireland, which has closed the gap between itself
and wealthier EU members significantly. However, Spain, Portugal, and Greece received similar levels of funding and did not do
so well. In fact, Portugal and Greece received more from the Cohesion Fund than Ireland, as a percentage of their GDP. This
suggests that Ireland's economic success should be attributed to
additional unique factors. Much of Ireland's recent economic
prosperity for instance, stems from the influx of a large number
of transnational corporations who manufacture high value-added
products for export. The economic impact of this influx has been
to greatly improve the Irish economy in relation to the rest of the
EU.

Role of the Member-States
Member states are expected to co-finance EU regional policy
programs within their own borders, however this is not where the
bulk of their influence lies. EU regional policy pales in comparison to the myriad of instruments and incentives that are available
to national governments to promote regional economic growth.
Even in countries where there is no explicit system for doing so,
regional transfers usually occur as a result of taxation and public
expenditure systems. In general, dynamic regions pay more tax
while less favored regions receive a disproportionate share of
public expenditure (Begg 1997). Although not specifically
planned, such arrangements help to minimize disparities within
countries. Other actions taken by national governments however,
work to offset these benefits. A recent EU study found that although most regional policies introduced by national governments support cohesion,
VOL.
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the pattern of expenditures on policies aimed at improving the competitiveness of national economies
by promoting R&D (Research and Development) is
virtually a mirror image of patterns of regional disparity ; the wealthier the region is, the more the government tends to spend on promoting R&D within
that region. Conversely, the poorer a region is, the
smaller the amount spent on R&D as a proportion of
regional GDP . (Regional Development Studies 29,
1998)

This finding is extremely significant when one considers the
vital role that innovation plays in developing and sustaining regional competitiveness.
Breadth of the Problem
When discussing regional disparities in the EU it is important
to recognize that the causes of such disparities vary from region
to region. In the four Cohesion countries the EU is faced with
implementing regional policy within national economies that are
themselves underdeveloped . This creates tensions between competing priorities, promoting national prosperity or reducing regional disparities. In these countries, underemployment,
unemployment and peripherality are also central concerns. In
central and northern Europe (Austria, Belgium , Denmark,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK) regional
problems are related to industrial decline and restructuring, often
accompanied by problems of urban decay. Germany is characterized by extreme internal disparities in wealth, requiring extensive national regional policies . The Nordic member states
(Finland and Sweden) are faced with peripherality, sparsely
populated areas, and harsh climates (Regional Development
Studies 29, 1998). The EU of course recognizes these distinctions in the different objectives laid out in the Structural Funds.
However, given the breadth of these problems and the limited
T HE J OU RN AL OF POLI TI CAL SCIE N CE
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resources available for regional policy, the impact of such funding must remain somewhat limited.
EMU
European Monetary Union could undermine regional policy
and regional convergence. The convergence criteria established
for entry into EMU required that some governments reduce
spending, potentially aggravating regional wealthy disparities,
even with the introduction of EMU such problems have not disappeared. The challenges of EMU are daunting, reconciling
competing policy demands, creating real convergence, and coping with asymmetric shocks. It is questionable whether the Structural funds will be substantial enough or flexible enough to make
significant contributions (Begg 1997). Moreover, such challenges are unlikely to be diminished in the near future. Unlike
member states, the EU has few powers to raise and re-distribute
funds. Without such mechanisms the development of comprehensive inter-regional transfers to cope with EMU will be limited
(Begg 1997).
CONCLUSION

Despite its weaknesses, none of this is an argument against
EU involvement in regional policy. Although many policy goals
are yet to be met, the data on national convergence indicates that
some progress has been made. It is also likely that EU regional
policy will become increasingly important in the near future.
EMU reduces the ability of member states to promote regional
convergence within their own borders; the EU can and should
step into this void. In producing an EU-wide regional policy, the
EU can promote economic convergence while ensuring fair
competition among regions, consistent with the requirements of
the single market. In this the EU can also play an important coordinating role, verifying that member state regional policies are
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consistent with overall EU goals. EU regional policy will also be
vital if the CCEE are to be successfully integrated into the Union. By EU standards, all of these countries are poor and will
require substantial investments be made if they are not to remain
so. Before accession much of this investment is provided through
the Phare Program, after accession it will be provided by the
Structural Funds.
To date, the impact of EU regional policy is perhaps more political than economic; regional policy is more likely to promote
the idea of cohesion than the actuality of convergence. The value
of cohesion if achieved however, should not be underestimated.
It refers to a social solidarity, a belief that it is the "common will
of all" to improve the living standards of all EU citizens no matter where they reside. Without cohesion the foundation upon
which the EU is based will be greatly weakened.
REFERENCES

Begg, Iain. 1997. "Reform of the Structural Funds after 1999" European Policy Paper No. 5, July 1997. Center for West European Studies: University of Pittsburgh.
Camey, John, Ray Hudson, and Jim Lewis. eds. 1980. Regions in Crisis: New Perspectives in Regional Theory. London: Saxon
House.
CEC (Commission of the European Communities) 1973. Report on the
Regional Problems in the Enlarged Community. Bntssels:
European Community.
___

1988. Peripheral Regions in a Community of Twelve Member
States. Brussels: European Community.

COR (Committee of Regions) Opinion. 1997. Views of the Regions and
Local Authorities on Arrangements for European Structural
Policy after 1999. http://www.cor.eu.int.
Dos Santos, Theotonio. 1971. "The Structure of Dependence." In Readings in American Imperialism, eds. K.T. Kan and Donald C.
Hodges. Boston: Extending Horizons.
THE JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

69

REGIONAL CONVERGENCE

EI-Agraa, Ali M. 1989. The Theory and Measurement of International
Integration. London: McMillan Press.
Haas, Ernst B. and Phillipe C. Schmitter. 1964. "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about
Unity in Latin America." International Organization 30: 173212.
Krause, Axel. 1994. The Europe of Regions Becoming Reality? Europe
no. 335. Brussels: Council of Europe.
Machlup, Fritz. 1977. The History of Thought on Economic Integration. London: Macmillan.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European
Community: A Liberal Intergovernrnentalist Approach." Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 no. 4: 473-524.
Myrdal, Gunder. 1957. Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions. London: Duckworth press.
Nye, Joseph N. 1971. Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization. Boston: Little, Brown.
Regional Development Studies. 1998. Economic and Social Cohesion
in the European Union: the impact of Member States' own
Policies. Regional Development Studies, 29. Luxembourg:
Office of Official Publications of the European Communities.
Robson, Peter. 1984. The Economics of International Integration. London: Allen and Unwin
Scmitter, Phillippe C. 1970. "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration. " International Organization 24:836-868.
Seers, Dudley, Bernard Schaffer, and Marja-Liisa Kiljunen. 1979. Underdeveloped Europe: Studies in Core-Periphery Relations.
Sussex: Harvester Press.
Williams, Allan M. 1987. The European Economy: A Geography of
Post-war Development. London: Hutchison.

VOL.

30 2002

